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Multinational Enterprises and Labour Rights: Concepts and Implementation  
 
Nicolas Bueno  
 
 
1 Introduction 
The responsibility of multinational enterprises to respect labour rights in global operations has 
been widely discussed in the corporate social responsibility and business ethics literature. In 
recent years, legal scholars have tried to formalize this discussion around the legal concepts of 
corporate due diligence and corporate liability. This contribution outlines these legal trends. It 
presents the relevant transnational case law and provides some ideas for interdisciplinary research 
on multinational enterprises and labour rights. 
 
Section 2 presents the concept of corporate human rights due diligence, as defined by the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. It 
then outlines the due diligence that multinational enterprises should apply with respect to labour 
rights in particular by introducing the concept of ‘corporate labour rights due diligence’. Section 
3 discusses how to implement corporate labour rights due diligence at the domestic level. It 
discusses emerging case law addressing liability of multinational enterprises for labour rights 
violations occurring at foreign subsidiaries or in their supply chain. It also outlines very recent 
domestic legislative initiatives that cover labour rights due diligence, such as the 2017 French loi 
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relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre1 or the 
Swiss Constitutional Initiative on Responsible Business,2 which is currently in discussion. 
 
Section 4 raises some research questions on multinational enterprises and labour rights. First, 
what is the scope of “labour rights” for due diligence? Regarding implementation of labour rights 
due diligence through liability, what can be learnt from business ethics and labour law scholars 
with regard to supply chains and new business models, such as platform work? Is it justified to 
design different conditions of liability depending on whether a multinational enterprise operates 
abroad through a subsidiary, a supplier or uses a platform to provide services? Finally, this 
contribution brings about some thoughts about the practical challenges and inherent limits of an 
approach aiming at ensuring that multinational enterprises respect labour rights in the current 
competitive global economy. 
 
2 The concept of corporate labour rights due diligence 
The UNGP and the OECD Guidelines are soft-law instruments and do not impose binding legal 
obligations upon states or companies. However, they provide a relatively clear standard of 
conduct for business enterprises in order for them to respect human rights including several 
labour rights.3 This section presents the due diligence that multinational enterprises should apply 
when operating abroad, first with regard to human rights generally (2.1) and then with respect to 
labour rights in particular (2.2). 
 
2.1 Corporate human rights due diligence 
The UNGP and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises define the due diligence that 
companies should apply within their responsibility to respect human rights throughout their 
global operations.4 Due diligence is defined as the process through which enterprises can identify, 
                                                 
1 Loi no 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre <http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl14-376.html> accessed 15 November 2018. 
2 Initiative populaire fédérale 'Entreprises responsables – pour protéger l’être humain et l’environnement' 
<www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis462t.html> accessed 15 November 2018. 
3 See infra section 2.2.1 The scope of labour rights for due diligence. 
4 See also the recently published OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, which provides 
a higher level of detail. See also generally, Nadia Bernaz, Business and Human Rights: History, Law and Policy – 
Bridging the Accountability Gap (Routledge 2017) 193-9; Justine Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
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prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse human 
rights impacts.5 The UNGP specify what is expected from business enterprises for each step of 
this process. The goal of human rights due diligence under the UNGP is to prevent or mitigate 
‘human rights risks’.6 They use a risk assessment language and approach.7  
 
First, business enterprises should identify and assess actual and potential adverse human rights 
impacts. Corporations are thus expected to obtain knowledge about the effects of the business 
corporations’ activities on rights-holders.8 Second, corporations should take appropriate action to 
prevent potential adverse human rights impacts or cease actual ones. In this regard, the UNGP 
clarify that appropriate action varies according to whether the business enterprise causes or 
contributes to an adverse impact, or whether it is involved solely because the impact is directly 
linked to its operations, products or services by a business relationship. Examples of these three 
scenarios in relation to labour issues are presented below.9 Third, they should account for how 
they address their actual and potential adverse impacts. Finally, where business enterprises 
identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for their 
remediation.10 
 
2.2 Corporate labour rights due diligence 
2.2.1 The scope of labour rights for due diligence 
There is no such concept as “corporate labour rights due diligence” in the legal literature. 
Nevertheless, the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights refers to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Human Rights: Soft Law or not Law?’, in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press 2013) 156-7. 
5 UNGP princ 17; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 14 and ch IV, 
commentary para 15. 
6 Björn Fasterling, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk Management: Social Risk Versus Human Rights Risk’ 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2016.26 (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 225, 226. 
7 Kendyl Salcitto and Mark Wielga, ‘What does Human Rights Due Diligence for Business Relationships Really 
Look Like on the Ground?’ https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2017.31 (2018) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 
113,114. 
8 Fasterling (n 6) 236. 
9 See infra section 2.2.2 General corporate labour rights due diligence. 
10 UNGP princ 17–21, for the steps. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 14-22. 
On these steps, Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to 
Hard Law at Last?’ (2014) 32 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 44, 55–7; Nicolas Bueno, ‘Corporate Liability 
for Violations of the Human Right to Just Conditions of Work in Extraterritorial Operations’ 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1298092 (2017) 21 The International Journal of Human Rights 565, 571–3. 
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internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO Declaration).11 As a 
result, corporate human rights due diligence applies to several labour rights entailed in 
international human rights treaties and in the ILO Declaration. 
 
From a human rights law perspective, corporate human rights due diligence applies thus at least 
to the prohibition of slavery and child labour, the human rights to work and to just conditions of 
work as well as trade union rights. At the universal level, these rights are guaranteed inter alia by 
Articles 4, 23 and 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by Articles 6, 7 and 8 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Each right entails its own 
specific elements. For example, the right to work entails the rights to the opportunity to gain a 
living by work and to freely accept work, which prohibits forced labour.12 The right to just and 
favorable conditions of work guarantees fair, equal and sufficient remuneration; healthy and safe 
working conditions; equal opportunity for promotion; and reasonable limitation of working hours 
as well as holidays with pay.13 
 
There has been much discussion regarding the extent to which these labour-related human rights 
are reflected in the ILO Declaration.14 The ILO Declaration also encompasses trade union rights, 
the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour, and the elimination 
of discrimination in employment.15 These core labour rights thus do not encompass, for example, 
                                                 
11 UNGP Princ 12. 
12 U.N. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 18: The Right to Work, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Nov. 24, 2005); see Nicolas Bueno, ‘From the Right to Work to Freedom from Work: 
Introduction to the Human Economy’ (2017) 33 The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 463, 466-9; Ben Saul et al., ‘Article 6: The Right to Work’, in Ben Saul et al. (eds), The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 
2014) 271-391; Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes and Mark Koenig, ‘Developing the Right to Work: Intersection and 
Dialoguing Human Rights and Economic Policy’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 1. 
13 CESCR, General Comment 23: The Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/23 (8 
Mar. 8, 2016); see Bueno (n 10) 568-70; Ben Saul et al. ‘Article 7: Just and Favourable Conditions of Work’, in Ben 
Saul et al. (eds), The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, and 
Materials (Oxford University Press 2014) 392-484. 
14 See Philip Alston, ‘“Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime’ 
(2004) 15 EJIL 457 and Brian Langille ‘Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to Alston), (2005) 16 EJIL 
409. 
15 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 1998, par. 3. 
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the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work within the human right to work or most 
elements of the right to just conditions of work, such as sufficient remuneration; healthy and safe 
working conditions, reasonable limitation of working hours or holidays with pay. Although the 
lack of correspondence has been criticized,16 while also justified on practical and strategic 
grounds,17 Alston notes that ‘the list should include the right to a safe and healthy workplace, the 
right to some limits on working hours, the right to reasonable rest periods, and protection against 
abusive treatment in the workplace.’18 Beyond this doctrinal debate, there is no doubt that these 
labour rights are human rights and thus are subject to corporate due diligence in the meaning of 
the UNGP. 
 
2.2.2 General corporate labour rights due diligence 
Multinational enterprises have the responsibility to respect both labour-related human rights as 
well as core labour rights. They are expected to carry out due diligence with respect to all these 
rights and should thus identify, take appropriate action and account for how they address adverse 
impacts on them. This contribution focuses on the appropriate action that should be taken once a 
risk has been identified. As stated above, appropriate action varies according to whether the 
business enterprise causes or contributes to an adverse impact, or whether it is involved solely 
because the impact is directly linked to its operations, products or services by a business 
relationship. 
 
First, where a business enterprise “causes or may cause” an adverse impact on labour-related 
human rights or core labour rights, it should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent the 
impact.19 This applies, for example, in the case of a business enterprise employing itself child 
labour. Second, where a business enterprise “contributes or may contribute” to an adverse impact 
on these rights, it should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution. 
Contributing should be interpreted as a substantial contribution, meaning an activity that causes, 
facilitates, or incentivizes another entity, such as a subsidiary or a supplier, to cause an adverse 
                                                 
16 Alston (n 14), 485. 
17 Langille (n 14) 409. 
18 Alston (n 14) 486. 
19 UNGP princ 19, commentary. 
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impact.20 The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights gives the 
example of an enterprise changing product requirements for suppliers without adjusting 
production deadlines and prices, thus pushing suppliers to breach labour standards in order to 
deliver.21 In this case, the enterprise should use its leverage to mitigate impacts, in addition to 
ceasing or preventing its contribution.22 Leverage is considered to exist where the enterprise has 
the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices of the entity that is causing an adverse 
impact, the supplier in the example.23 
 
In the two first scenarios, the business enterprise causes or contributes to adverse impacts through 
its own activities, including its own activities in the supply chain.24 Finally, the business 
enterprise can be involved solely because the impact is directly linked to its operations, products 
or services by a business relationship.25 This is the case, for example, when a supplier acts 
contrary to the terms of its contract and uses child or bonded labour to manufacture a product for 
the contracting enterprise, without any intended or unintended pressure (contribution) from this 
enterprise to do so.26 The legal literature provides examples in which the notions of 
“contribution” and “directly linked” are sometimes understood in different ways.27 In this third 
scenario, the appropriate measure to be taken depends on the leverage the enterprise has on the 
entity causing or contributing to the adverse impact. If the business enterprise has leverage to 
mitigate the adverse impact it should exercise this, as in the contribution scenario. If it lacks 
leverage, it should try to increase its leverage. Finally, when increasing leverage is impossible, it 
                                                 
20 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 14. 
21 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide (United Nations 2012) 19 [OHCHR, Interpretative Guide]. 
22 UNGP princ 19, commentary. 
23 ibid; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 19. 
24 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 17. 
25 UNGP princ 19, commentary; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, A 12. 
26 OHCHR, Interpretative Guide (n 21) 56. See also Christine Kaufmann, ‘Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: 
Grenzenlose Verantwortlichkeit? (2016) Swiss Review of Business and Financial Market Law 45, 51; Nicolas 
Bueno, ‘La responsabilité des entreprises de respecter les droits de l’Homme: État de la pratique suisse’ (2017) 
Pratique Juridique Actuelle 1015, 1016, for other examples. 
27 Compare Olivier De Schutter ‘Corporations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’, in Eibe Riedel, Gilles 
Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary 
Issues and Challenges (Oxford University Press 2014) 212-16; Olga Martin-Ortega (n 6) 56; Christine Kaufmann et 
al., Extraterritorialität im Bereich Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte (Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights 
2016) 16-17. 
 7 
 
should consider terminating the relationship.28 In the two last scenarios, another entity is always 
involved. Therefore, in both situations the appropriate actions to be taken vary according to the 
extent of an enterprise’s leverage over another entity in addressing the impact.29 
 
2.2.3 Specific corporate labour rights due diligence 
In addition to general due diligence that corporations should apply to the above-mentioned 
labour-related human rights and core labour rights, the ILO Tripartite Declaration and Chapter V 
of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on employment and industrial relations 
entail specific recommendations for multinational enterprises with regard to labour issues. Both 
refer to the UNGP and use the same concept of due diligence. Other international guidelines 
focus on specific labour issues, such as the ILO Child Labour Guidance Tool for Business or on 
labour issues within specific sectors, such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector. The following paragraphs outline some 
recommendations of the ILO Tripartite Declaration and Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises with respect to working conditions, employment, forced labour and 
trade union rights. 
 
With respect to working conditions, both the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises recommend, for example, that wages offered by 
multinational enterprises be not less favorable to the workers than those offered by comparable 
employers in the country concerned. Where comparable employers may not exist, they should 
provide the best possible wages, benefit and conditions of work.30 They should at least be 
adequate to satisfy the basic needs of the workers and their families.31 Multinational enterprises 
should also maintain the highest standards of safety and health within the enterprise bearing in 
mind their relevant experience within the enterprise as a whole, including any knowledge of 
special hazards.32  
                                                 
28 UNGP princ 19, commentary; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch II, commentary para 22, for the 
steps to be taken before termination. 
29 UNGP princ 19(b)(ii). 
30 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 5 th ed, 2017, para 
41; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch V, para 4(a). 
31 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch V, para. 4(b). 
32 ILO Tripartite Declaration, para 44. See also OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch V, para. 4(c). 
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Regarding employment, multinational enterprises should give priority to the employment, 
occupational development, promotion and advancement of nationals of the host country at all 
levels33 and be guided throughout their operations by the principle of equality of opportunity and 
treatment in employment.34 They also should contribute to the elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labour and take adequate steps to ensure that forced or compulsory labour does not 
exist in their global operations.35 Finally, with regard to trade union rights, multinational 
enterprises should provide workers’ representatives with facilities as may be necessary to assist in 
the development of effective collective agreements. In addition, they should enable 
representatives of the workers to conduct negotiations with representatives of management and 
not threaten to utilize a capacity to transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from the 
country concerned in order to influence unfairly those negotiation.36  
 
This section has given a non-exhaustive overview of the general and specific due diligence that 
can be expected from a multinational enterprise with regard to labour rights throughout its 
international operations. However, providing an international standard of conduct does not say 
much about how to implement it in practice at the domestic level, which is the subject of the 
following section. 
 
3 Legal implementation of corporate labour rights due diligence 
Whilst the OECD Guidelines are addressed only to private corporate actors and among them only 
to multinational enterprises, the UNGP recommend that states implement and enforce laws that 
are aimed at, or have the effect of requiring, all business enterprises to respect human rights.37 
However, the UNGP do not entail specific recommendations about legal sanctions, such as 
corporate criminal or civil liability, to ensure that a business enterprise carries out human rights 
due diligence throughout its operations. According to Fasterling, due diligence is, at least 
primarily, not to be understood as a liability standard that exerts a certain standard of care, 
                                                 
33 ILO Tripartite Declaration, para 18. 
34 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch V, para 1(e). 
35 Ibid., ch V, para 1(d); ILO Tripartite Declaration, para 25. 
36 ibid, para 57-9; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ch V, para 2(a) and 7. 
37 UNGP princ 3(a). 
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against which a business enterprise’s action as judged in order to attribute ex-post 
responsibility.38 This gap between due diligence and liability is sometimes referred by business 
and human rights scholars as to the accountability gap.39 
 
That being said, pillar III of the UNGP on access to remedy recommends that States take 
appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing 
business-related human rights abuses, including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and 
other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.40 Among other legal 
barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy, the UNGP mention the way in which 
legal responsibility is attributed among members of a corporate group under domestic laws. This 
should not facilitate the avoidance of appropriate accountability.41 
 
Despite the lack of international recommendations as to how states should ensure that 
multinational enterprises carry out human rights and labour rights due diligence in their global 
operations, several states are currently taking steps to implement the concept of corporate human 
rights due diligence at the domestic level. The following section first discusses emerging case-
law on liability of multinational enterprises for the harm caused to foreign subsidiaries and 
suppliers’ employees (3.1). It shows the uncertainty regarding the outcome of such transnational 
litigation in the absence of domestic legislation on labour rights due diligence. It then presents 
domestic laws already in force or currently in discussion aiming at implementing corporate 
labour rights due diligence (3.2). This section discusses only case-law and legislation that cover 
labour-related human rights or core labour rights.42 
 
3.1 Emerging “labour rights due diligence” case-law 
3.1.1 Parent company liability cases  
                                                 
38 Fasterling (n 6) 228. 
39 Bernaz (n 4) 8; Anita Ramasastry, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging 
the Gap Between Responsibility and Accountability’, (2015) 14 Journal of Human Rights, 24. 
40 UNGP princ 26, commentary. 
41 ibid; see Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale and Olivier De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial 
Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (International Corporate Accountability 
Roundtable, Core and European Coalition for Corporate Justice 2013) 61, for comments. 
42 For other domestic due diligence laws beyond labour issues, Nicolas Bueno, ‘The Swiss Popular Initiative on 
Responsible Business: From Responsibility to Liability’ in Liesbeth Enneking et al. (eds.), Corporate Responsibility, 
Human Rights and the Law, London (Routledge 2020). 
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The case decision in Chandler v. Cape is certainly the most discussed decision in the business 
and human rights literature.43 Mr. Chandler worked in Cape’s subsidiary, a factory producing 
asbestos. In 2007, he contracted asbestosis as a result of exposure to asbestos dust during his 
period of employment. The Court of Appeal developed the following four criteria to establish 
when law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its 
subsidiary’s employees. 
 
(1) [T]he businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect the same; 
(2) the parent has, or ought to have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect 
of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary's system of work 
is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the parent 
knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on 
its using that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection. 
 
In this specific case, the Court of Appeal found the parent company Cape liable for asbestos-
related injuries caused to an employee of a subsidiary. As Cassel notes, Chandler is only a 
beginning of the common law on parent company duties of care and these criteria were tailored to 
the particular facts of the case.44 Two years later in Thompson v. Renwick, those criteria were 
applied to Renwick, the parent company of a subsidiary for which Mr. Thompson worked. Mr. 
Thompson was also exposed to asbestos dust in his work, and as a result, had been seriously 
incapacitated by diffuse pleural thickening. Reversing the trial court’s decision establishing 
Renwick’s duty of care, the appellate court found that there was no evidence that Renwick ‘at any 
                                                 
43 Among others, Christine Kaufman and Lukas Heckendorn, Access to Remedy (Swiss Center of Expertise in 
Human Rights 2018) 68, Robert McCorqudale, Lise Smit, Stuart Neely and Robin Brooks, ‘Human Rights Due 
Diligence in Law and Practice: Good Practices and Challenges for Business Enterprises’ 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2017.2 (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 195, 203; Doug Cassel, ‘Outlining 
the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2016.15 (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 179, 196; Bueno (n 10) 575-6; 
Christine Kaufmann, ‘Holding Multinational Corporations accountable for Human Rights Violations: Litigation 
Outside the United States’ in Dorothee Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan (eds), Business and Human Rights: From 
Principles to Practice (Routledge 2016) 253, 260. 
44 Cassel (n 43) 196. 
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time carried on any business at all apart from that of holding shares in other companies’.45 The 
first criteria of the Chandler test was thus not met.46 
 
Similar questions of parent liability for the harm caused to employees of a subsidiary were 
addressed in France in the cases of Areva and Comilog.47 In Venel v. Areva, the court established 
the circumstances under which a parent company can be, next to the subsidiary, a co-employer 
and accordingly have a duty to ensure that employees are protected against work-related 
illnesses. Mr. Venel worked for the Cominak uranium-processing factory in Niger. He contracted 
lung cancer and asked the parent company, Areva, for compensation, claiming Areva held a duty 
to ensure protective health measures as a co-employer. The tribunal came to the conclusion that 
Areva was effectively a co-employer on the grounds that it held shares in Cominak and was the 
concession holder of the mine exploited by Cominak; that Cominak had a postal address in 
France at the headquarters of Areva; that both Areva and Cominak conducted identical activities 
and exploited the same mining site; that Areva, as an expert in the nuclear industry, could not 
ignore the risks for employees; and finally that Areva had established a local observatory for the 
health of workers in uranium mines.48 
 
However, the court found on appeal that to be co-employer there must be an intermingling of 
activities, interest, and management with the contractual employer. This was not the case as 
Cominak was not technically a controlled subsidiary of Areva, which held only 34% of its shares. 
Areva did not hold the majority of seats on the board of directors of Cominak, which remained 
autonomous in its management. The fact that both shared a common postal address and that 
Areva held the concession to exploit the mine was insufficient. Finally, the fact that Areva agreed 
to implement local observatories could not provide evidence that Areva recognized its status as 
                                                 
45 Thompson v. The Renwick Group Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 635, para. 37. 
46 Bueno (n 10) 576, for further comments. 
47 Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 24 octobre 2013, no. 12/05650 (Areva); Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 10 
septembre 2015, nos 11/05955 and 11/0596 (Comilog). For more details on the case of Comilog, see Liesbeth 
Enneking, ‘Paying the Price for Socially Irresponsible Business Practices?’ (2017) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 988, 
991; Bueno (n 10) 576–7, on the case of Areva. 
48 Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale de Melun, Décision du 11 mai 2012, n° 10/00924, 6 and 7. See also 
Ronin, ‘Faute inexcusable dans les groupes de sociétés: la responsabilité de la société mère retenue en cas de co-
emploi’ (2012) 76 Revue Lamy Droit des affaires 88, 89. 
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employer. The Court concluded that Areva was not a co-employer and thus had no duty to 
safeguard Mr. Venel’s health while working at Cominak.49  
 
3.1.2 Liability of contracting companies in supply chains 
Another complex question is that of the conditions of liability of contracting companies for the 
harm caused to employees of contracted suppliers. The matter of Doe v. Wal-Mart shows the 
criteria developed by a U.S. court in 2009 in order to establish the liability of a contracting 
company for the harm suffered by employees of foreign suppliers. The plaintiffs were employees 
of companies located in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua that sold goods 
to Wal-Mart. They relied on a code of conduct included in Wal-Mart’s supply contracts, 
specifying basic labour standards that suppliers must meet. They alleged that short deadlines and 
low prices in Wal-Mart’s supply contracts forced suppliers to violate standards in order to satisfy 
the terms of the contracts.50 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the supply 
contracts did not intend to protect the workers.51 Furthermore, it found, as in the case of Areva, 
that Wal-Mart was not the plaintiffs’ joint employer. A joint employer must have ‘the right to 
control and direct the activities of the person rendering service, or the manner and method in 
which the work is performed.’ The Court added that ‘the right to control employment requires … 
a comprehensive and immediate level of “day-to-day” authority over employment decisions.’52 In 
practice, no such right of control was exercised by Wal-Mart. 
 
Finally, the ongoing German proceeding Jabir et al v. KiK might shed light on the liability of 
contracting companies to ensure safe working conditions at foreign suppliers. In September 2012, 
over 250 workers died in a fire at a factory in Pakistan that supplied the German textile 
corporation KiK. In March 2015, four plaintiffs filed a compensation claim against KiK. They 
alleged that KiK, which was buying 70% of the textiles produced by the factory, shared a 
responsibility for the fire-safety deficiencies in the Pakistani factory.53 
 
                                                 
49 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 24 Oct. 2013, no. 12/05650. 
50 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009), 680. 
51 See Haley Revak, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: Binding Contract or Ideal Publicity?’, (2012) 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
1645, 1654 (2012). 
52 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009), 682. 
53 ECCHR, ‘Pakistan: Cheap Clothes, Perilous Conditions’, Case Report, April 2016, at 1. 
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The emerging case-law raises interesting questions of liability of multinational enterprises for 
labour rights adverse impacts at foreign subsidiaries or suppliers. Except for the case of Jabir et 
al v. KiK, the facts of these cases occurred before the adoption of the UNGP and its international 
corporate human rights due diligence standard. It shows the uncertainty regarding the criteria to 
be applied to determine corporate liability for the damage caused to employees of a subsidiary or 
a controlled supplier in the absence of a legal standard of due diligence for multinational 
enterprises with respect to labour rights. This may explain why states are currently taking legal 
steps to close this gap by implementing corporate human rights due diligence in their domestic 
legislation as presented in the next section. These are the so-called “due-diligence laws”. 
 
3.2 Emerging due diligence laws 
Three categories of “human rights due diligence laws” can be distinguished. First, mandatory 
disclosure laws only require that companies disclose information regarding human rights (3.2.1). 
Mandatory due diligence laws contain in addition the standard of conduct that companies must 
adopt to ensure respect for human rights (3.2.2). Finally, due diligence provisions may be 
coupled with explicit liability provisions that clarify the legal consequences of failing to comply 
with due diligence duties (3.2.3). Only due diligence laws covering labour issues will be 
presented. 
 
3.2.1 Mandatory disclosure laws 
An increasing number of laws require that companies disclose information regarding labour 
issues. For example, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 requires large retail 
seller and manufacturer doing business in California to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery 
and human trafficking from their supply chains.54 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 in the United 
Kingdom has a similar scope. It requires that large commercial organizations prepare a slavery 
and human trafficking statement. Among other information, the statement must include 
information about parts of the organization’s business and supply chains where a risk of slavery 
                                                 
54 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 (US), s 1714.43(a)(1). See Benjamin T Greer and Jeffrey 
Purvis, ‘Corporate Supply Chain Transparency: California’s Seminal Attempt to Discourage Forced Labour’ (2016) 
20 The International Journal of Human Rights, 55–77, for an overview. 
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and human trafficking exists, and the steps it has taken to address that risk.55 A comparable 
Modern Slavery Bill is discussion in Australia. 
 
The EU Directive 2014/95 on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information also enters into the 
category of mandatory disclosure laws. Large enterprises must include a non-financial statement 
containing information about the development, performance, position, and impact of their activity 
relating to employee matters, among several other elements.56 The enterprise has to report the 
risks of adverse impact stemming not only from its own activities, but also from those linked to 
its operations, products, services and business relationships, including its supply and 
subcontracting chains,57 thus in line with the UNGP. However, the company is not required to 
pursue policies in relation to those matters; in that case, it must only provide a clear and reasoned 
explanation for not doing so.58 
 
The California Act, the Modern Slavery Act, and the EU Directive 2014/95 do not introduce a 
due diligence standard. They also do not clarify the conditions of liability for parent or 
contracting companies. Some suggest that even if information that companies must disclose does 
not lead to any legal sanctions, companies may still seek to change their behavior if they believe 
that such information would lead to non-legal sanctions, such as reputational harm.59 These 
regulations may be a step towards more accountability. However, as McCorquodale and al. note, 
this legislation and regulation generally requires reporting by companies of their activities 
without expressly requiring companies to address and remediate their human rights impacts.60 In 
the end, since they do not clarify any due diligence standard and conditions of liability, they do 
                                                 
55 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK), s 54(4)(a). 
56 Parliament and Council Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards 
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups [2014] OJ L.330/1, art 
19a(1) (Non-Financial Disclosure Directive). 
57 ibid art 19a(1)(d) and preamble, para 8. 
58 ibid art 19a(1). 
59 Stephen Park, ‘Human Rights Reporting as Self-Interest: The Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Corporate 
Disclosure’, in Robert C Bird, Daniel R Cahoy and Jamie D. Prenkert (eds), Law, Business and Human Rights: 
Bridging the Gap (Edward Elgar 2014) 53. 
60 McCorqudale et al. (n 43) 202. See also Karin Buhmann, ‘Neglecting the Proactive Aspect of Human Rights Due 
Diligence? A Critical Appraisal of the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive as a Pillar One Avenue for 
Promoting Pillar Two Action’, https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2017.24 (2017) 3 Business and Human Rights Journal 23, 
for other critics. 
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not significantly reduce the uncertainty related to outcomes of transnational litigation for 
corporate labour rights. 
 
3.2.2 Mandatory due diligence laws 
In specific sectors, such as conflict minerals, some laws have introduced mandatory standards of 
conduct beyond disclosure requirements. For example, the Dodd–Frank Act on conflict 
minerals61 requires to adopt a due diligence standard that must be exercised once a company has 
determined that it uses conflict minerals.62 The EU has recently taken a similar approach by 
defining the due diligence that importers of specific minerals originating from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas must adopt beyond disclosure requirements.63 Both documents use the 
OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas as standard of conduct.64 Regarding labour issues, and in addition 
to conducting general and specific labour rights due diligence as presented above, companies 
extracting, trading, handling and exporting minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas 
must commit to adopt, disseminate and incorporate in contracts with suppliers a policy stating 
that they do not tolerate the commission of any forms of forced or compulsory labour or the worst 
forms of child labour.65 According to the OECD Guidance, companies should also know the 
conditions of extraction, mineral transport, handling and trade in order to identify the existence of 
any forms of forced labour or the worst forms of child labour.66  
 
Another example of a mandatory due diligence law covering labour issues is the Dutch Child 
Labour Due Diligence Law, which is currently in discussion. The proposal entails a mandatory 
due diligence provision. Companies based in the Netherlands should act in accordance with the 
International Labour Organization Child Labour Guidance Tool for Business.67 In addition, the 
                                                 
61 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (US), s 1502(b)(p)(1)(a). See also Park (n 59) 
63, for reporting requirements. 
62 Martin-Ortega (n 10) 66. 
63 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence 
obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum, and tungsten; their ores; and gold originating from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas [2017] OJ L.130/1 (Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation). 
64 ibid 206. Martin Ortega (n 10) 66. 
65 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas, 3rd ed., 20-21. 
66 ibid 59-60. 
67 ibid art 7(1). 
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proposal entails administrative and criminal fines for companies that do not submit a declaration 
that they have conducted due diligence, or that fail to conduct due diligence when required.68 The 
legislative proposal is currently pending before the Dutch Senate.69  
 
In mandatory due diligence laws, sanctions are sometimes in place, as in the Dutch proposal, to 
require a company to carry out due diligence. Similarly, EU member states are required to carry 
out ex-post checks in order to ensure that importers of conflict minerals comply with their due 
diligence obligations.70 However, like mandatory disclosure laws, none of these mandatory due 
diligence laws mention or elaborate on corporate liability for the harm once it has occurred, 
which brings us to the last category of due diligence laws. They do not provide for access to 
remedies for the affected employees. 
 
3.2.3 Mandatory due diligence and liability provisions 
The third category of due diligence laws includes those defining the standard of corporate due 
diligence and, in addition, specifying the legal consequences in the event of harm. Legal 
consequences can take the form of criminal liability or civil liability depending on who must 
enforce the due diligence standard – the public prosecutor or the victim. There are at least two 
current examples regarding civil liability: the French loi relative au devoir de diligence and the 
currently discussed Swiss Constitutional Initiative on Responsible Business. 
 
The French loi relative au devoir de vigilance establishes a link between due diligence and civil 
corporate liability.71 It first requires that large companies based in France establish and 
implement a vigilance plan. This plan shall include measures to allow for risk identification and 
for the prevention of inter alia severe violations of human rights, serious bodily injury and health 
                                                 
68 ibid art 7(2). See also Christine Kaufmann, ‘Menschen-und umweltrechtliche Sorgfaltsprüfung im internationalen 
Vergleich, (2017) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 974. 
69 See <www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34506_initiatiefvoorstel_kuiken>accessed 18 November 2018 and 
<www.eerstekamer.nl/nieuws/20171219/debat_wet_zorgplicht_kinderarbeid>accessed 18 November 2018. 
70 Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation (n 63) art 11. 
71 Loi no 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre (Loi relative au devoir de diligence). Non-official translation provided by the European Coalition for 
Corporate Justice available at <https://business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-
translation> accessed 18 November 2018. 
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risks.72 It has a broad scope and covers most labour-related human rights and core labour rights. 
However, a question remains as to the definition of “severe” violations. Based on the 
international UNGP due diligence framework, the scope of due diligence covers risks resulting 
from the operations of the company and of the companies it controls as well as from the 
operations of the subcontractors or suppliers with whom it maintains an established commercial 
relationship.73 Finally, the law expressly establishes a fault liability for the company’s own 
actions and omissions on the basis of the general tort of negligence.74 It states that the author of 
any failure to comply with its due diligence duties shall be liable and obliged to compensate for 
the harm that due diligence would have permitted to avoid.75 The French law thus expressly 
translates due diligence into an enforceable duty of care. As a result, employees of a subsidiary 
and of some suppliers can based their claim on a legal provision to challenge the conduct of the 
parent or contracting company. 
 
The second example is the Swiss Constitutional Initiative on Responsible Business.76 The 
Responsible Business Initiative aims at adding article 101a, ‘Responsibility of Business’, to the 
Swiss Constitution. The initiative collected the requisite threshold of 100,000 signatures. The 
Parliament is currently discussing whether to adopt a specific due diligence law in order to avoid 
a popular vote.77 If both chambers of the Parliament cannot agree on a text or if the proponents of 
the initiative consider an agreed text unsatisfactory, the Swiss citizens will decide over the 
Responsible Business Initiative by 2020 at the latest. 
 
According to the text of the constitutional initiative, companies are required to carry out 
appropriate due diligence. They must identify impacts on internationally recognized human 
                                                 
72 Loi relative au devoir de diligence, art. L. 225-102-4. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau de Lomenie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic 
Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 317, 321. 
75 Loi relative au devoir de diligence, art. L. 225-102-5. 
76 Initiative populaire fédérale 'Entreprises responsables – pour protéger l’être humain et l’environnement' 
<www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis462t.html> accessed 15 November 2018. Unofficial English translation available 
at Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, ‘The Initiative Text with Explanations’ <http://konzern-
initiative.ch/initiativtext/?lang=en> accessed 18 November 2018. 
77 See Swiss National Council, Rapport du comité des affaires juridiques sur la révision du droit de la société 
anonyme (18 May 2018), <https://www.parlament.ch/centers/kb/Documents/2016/Rapport_de_la_commission_CAJ-
N_16.077_2018-05-18.pdf> accessed 15 November 2018. 
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rights, take appropriate measures to prevent their violation, cease existing ones, and account for 
the actions taken.78 Internationally recognized human rights encompass explicitly labour-related 
human rights as well as core labour rights.79 As in France, risks cover also those associated from 
the activities of subsidiaries and more generally of business relationships. Regarding liability, the 
constitutional initiative brings about a specific liability for the harm caused by controlled 
companies.80 Accordingly, when a controlled company, such as a subsidiary, causes harm, the 
parent company is liable unless it can prove that it took all due care to avoid the loss or damage, 
or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had been taken. This specific liability 
for controlled companies addresses the difficulty that plaintiffs may face in bringing evidence 
about the conduct of controlling companies located abroad. For the rest, it remains the plaintiff’s 
responsibility to prove the harm, the causality, and the control relationship between the business 
entities.81 Table I compares domestic labour rights due diligence laws adopted and currently in 
discussion as presented so far. 
 
Title (chronological order) Disclosure 
provision 
Due diligence 
provision 
Liability provision 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
2010 (US) 
X   
Dodd–Frank Act, sec 1502, 2010 (US) X X  
Directive 2014/95 on Disclosure of Non-
Financial Information 2014 (EU) 
X   
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK) X   
Loi relative au devoir de vigilance 2017 (FR) X X X 
Regulation 2017/821 on Supply Chain Due 
Diligence Obligations for Importers of [Minerals] 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 
2017 (EU) 
X X  
Child Labour Due Diligence Proposal, currently 
in discussion (NL) 
X X  
Popular Initiative on Responsible Business, 
currently in discussion (CH) 
X X X 
Modern Slavery Bill, in discussion (AU) X   
Parliamentary Counter-Proposal to the Popular 
Initiative on Responsible Business, in discussion 
(CH) 
X X X 
                                                 
78 Swiss Constitution, Proposed art 101a(2)(a). 
79 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, ‘The Initiative Text with Explanations’ <http://konzern-
initiative.ch/initiativtext/?lang=en> accessed 18 April. 2018 
80 Swiss Constitution, Proposed art 101a(2)(c). See Bueno (n 42); Gregor Geisser, ‘Die 
Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: Darstellung, rechtliche Würdigung und mögliche Umsetzung’ (2017) Pratique 
Juridique Actuelle 943, 948–949. 
81 Table based on Bueno (n 42) and updated.  
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Table I: Domestic “labour rights due diligence laws” presented in chronological order82 
 
4 Research agenda on multinational enterprises and labour rights  
4.1 The material scope of “labour rights” for due diligence. 
A first challenge regarding labour rights due diligence concerns its material scope. What are 
labour rights risks for due diligence and how can they be measured? As Fasterling notes for 
general human rights due diligence, the UNGP have adopted a risk management approach 
towards human rights, implying that “adverse human rights impacts” as human rights risks can be 
measured. He adds that this premise is alone challenging because convincing methodologies for 
measuring adverse human rights impact have yet to be developed or disclosed.83 In the same line, 
Baumann-Pauly and al. envision a future business and human rights agenda that strategically 
focuses on the development of measurable industry-specific standard and the adoption of credible 
metrics that make transparent the extent of corporate compliance with human rights.84 This is also 
true for labour rights due diligence. 
 
To answer this challenge for labour rights, there is an evident need to combine interdisciplinary 
research in human rights law and business ethics. Regarding labour rights due diligence, the 
UNGP, ILO Tripartite Declaration and Chapter V of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises do not sufficiently define “labour rights adverse impacts”. Human rights and labour 
lawyers should continue to define them in order for business ethics scholars to be able to create 
effective and implementable labour rights risk management tools. Concretely, there is a need to 
define more clearly the elements of the human right to just conditions of work. For example, 
what is the scope of corporate due diligence with respect to trade unions rights for companies 
operating in countries, such as China, that have not ratified the fundamental ILO Fundamental 
Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize? Are two weeks 
of holidays with pay per year instead of the recommended minimum three weeks a negative 
human rights impact to be addressed by multinational enterprises in the same way as child 
                                                 
82 Original source, Bueno (n 42) 
83 Fasterling (n 6) 237. 
84 Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, Justine Nolan and Michael Posner, ‘The Future of Business and Human Rights: 
Challenges and Opportunities’ in Dorothee Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan (eds), Business and Human Rights: 
From Principles to Practice (Routlege 2016) 316, 317. 
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labour? What constitutes a “severe” and thus a “non-severe” (labour) human right violation in the 
French loi de vigilance?  
 
4.2 Labour rights due diligence, enforceable duty of care and the scope of corporate liability 
A second challenge is translating the concept of labour rights due diligence into an enforceable 
duty of care. Legal research should continue clarifying the vertical scope of labour rights due 
diligence for both parent companies and contracting companies along the value chain. In this 
regard, it seems to be acknowledged that multinational enterprises should conduct due diligence 
along the entire value or supply chain. Corporate liability for labour rights adverse impacts in 
global operations only starts to be discussed in courts and by legal scholars and mostly for parent 
companies.85 Corporate liability for labour rights adverse impacts remains widely undeveloped 
for contracting companies’ liability in supply chains. Legal research would greatly benefit from 
economic research on supply chains in order to clarify labour rights due diligence and the scope 
of corporate liability in this regard. There has been an interesting attempt to combine law and 
business ethics showing how mandatory due diligence looks like in practice.86 Why does a 
clothing retail-company traditionally buy its production from foreign suppliers instead of 
producing through foreign subsidiaries? Should this corporate structure justify different rules of 
corporate liability?  
 
Additionally, and very interestingly, labour law scholars working are also enlightening the debate 
about new business strategies regarding non-standard form of employment, such as platform 
work in the on-demand economy.87 Most of these actors are multinational enterprises operating 
abroad without subsidiaries or foreign suppliers. How does the UNGP and OECD concept of 
human rights due diligence apply to these business models? This question was raised by Natour.88 
What does this mean for liability? This question relates to identifying who should be defined as 
an employer in complex corporate groups, supply chains or business models for the purpose of 
establishing a duty of care towards affected workers. 
                                                 
85 See Cassel (n 43), for example. 
86 McCorqudale and al (n 43). 
87 In this book,Valerio de Stefano and Antonio Aloisi, ‘Fundamental Labour Rights, Platform Work and Human-
Rights Protection of Non-Standard Workers’, ch 19. 
88 Faris Natour, ‘Respecting Human Rights in the On-Demand Economy: Closing the New Governance Gap’ 
https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2016.7 (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 315, 315-20. 
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4.3 Labour human rights due diligence in a global competitive economy? 
More generally, there is also room for more self-critic of the business and (labour) human rights 
approach in a global competitive economy. A practical difficulty of implementing labour rights 
due diligence in a globalized economy lies in the state-centeredness of the global economy, 
which falls short of global cooperation.89 Where states are competing against each other for 
individual economic interests, it is unlikely that they will place enforceable responsibilities 
through liability provisions for multinational enterprises to respect labour rights abroad.90 It is 
true that there are ongoing discussions about a binding treaty on human rights that may level the 
playing field.91 However, in the absence of such cooperation, more research is needed on 
economic impacts, positive and negative, for workers worldwide of requiring multinational 
enterprises to conduct labour rights due diligence. Would labour rights due diligence benefit low-
skill workers at the bottom of the supply chain or workers in industrialized countries avoiding 
delocalization? To which extent and how? 
 
Finally, one must acknowledge the inherent limits of the “business and labour rights approach”, 
which is before all defensive and reactional. For example, there is no discussion about 
multinational enterprises not only respecting, but also fulfilling labour rights. What about 
requiring multinational enterprises to hire more or hire disadvantaged individuals that do not 
meet the needs of the labour markets as a way to fulfil the human right to work?92 What about 
incentivizing positive impacts on labour of companies truly committed to positive change? The 
business and labour rights approach is not potentialist or proactive. It does not work in the global 
economy.93 The business and labour rights approach only thinks of ways to ensure minimum 
standards of workers’ protection by ensuring that enterprises meet their responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
89 Id. at 117. 
90 Although the French loi relative au devoir de vigilance proves the contrary. 
91 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2015.5 
(2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 41, 41-67. 
92 See Olivier De Schutter, ‘Welfare State Reform and Social Rights’ (2015) 33 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts 123, 156.  
93 Nicolas Bueno, ‘From the Right to Work to Freedom from Work: Introduction to the Human Economy’ 33 The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 463. 
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5 Conclusion 
In recent years, legal scholars have clarified the concept of “corporate human rights due 
diligence” as defined at the international level by the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. They are also discussing how to translate such concept into an 
enforceable duty of care for corporate liability. This contribution has applied these developments 
by presenting the due diligence that multinational enterprises should apply to labour-related 
human rights and core labour rights under the concept of “corporate labour rights due diligence”.  
 
Providing an international standard of conduct for multinational enterprises with respect to labour 
rights does not say much about how to implement it in practice at the domestic level. As 
discussed in the contribution, there is emerging case-law on parent company liability for the harm 
caused to workers at foreign subsidiaries. There are also ongoing cases of contracting companies’ 
liability for the harm caused to workers employed by foreign suppliers. However, in the absence 
of clear conditions of liability at the domestic level, the outcome of such transnational litigation 
proves to be very uncertain for both workers and multinational enterprises. This may explain why 
some states are currently taking steps to implement the concept of corporate human rights due 
diligence in their domestic legislation, such as the 2017 French loi relative au devoir de vigilance 
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre. 
 
Despite some trends towards domestic implementation of labour rights due diligence, many 
questions remain. First, what is the exact scope of “labour rights” for due diligence? Regarding 
liability, the business and human rights literature would also greatly benefit from business ethics 
and labour law scholars working on new form of non-standard employment, such as platform 
work. Should corporate liability for labour rights abuses be different based on whether the 
multinational enterprise operates through subsidiaries, suppliers or use platforms to provide 
services? Finally, there is room for self-critic on the inherent limits of the “business and labour 
rights approach” being before all defensive and reactional and difficult to implement in the 
competitive and state-centered global economy. There is room for complementary focusing on 
positive change. 
 
 
